Hurricane Katrina

       State and local governments, with the Federal government playing a supporting role, traditionally have handled disaster response in America. Limits on the Federal government’s role in disaster response are deeply rooted in American tradition. State and local governments—who know the unique requirements of their citizens and geography and are best positioned to respond to incidents in their own jurisdictions—will always play a large role in disaster response. The Federal government’s supporting role respects these practical points and the sovereignty of the States as well as the power of governors to direct activities and coordinate efforts within their States. While we remain faithful to basic constitutional doctrine and time-tested principles, we must likewise accept that events such as Hurricane Katrina and the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, require us to tailor the application of these principles to the threats we confront in the 21st Century.
       Prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, State and local officials did not use the Emergency Alert System (EAS) in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Alabama. However, the National Hurricane Center (NHC) disseminated warnings and forecasts via NOAA Radio and the Internet, operating in conjunction with the EAS. Initially, these reports were issued every six hours; however, as the storm neared landfall they were updated with increasing frequency. In accordance with NOAA policy, local weather offices took over responsibility for these broadcasts shortly after Hurricane Katrina made landfall. At this time, Weather Service offices like the one in Slidell, Louisiana, began to transmit real-time hazard information using both NOAA Radio and the EAS. These reports were distributed to all area media outlets as well as local emergency management personnel. When the severity of the storm finally forced the Slidell weather office offline, operations were successfully transferred to weather centers in Mobile and Baton Rouge.
       The complete devastation of the communications infrastructure left responders without a reliable network to use for coordinating emergency response operations. Flooding blocked access to the police and fire dispatch centers in New Orleans; neither 911 service nor public safety radio communications functioned sufficiently. In addition, the State of Louisiana’s 800 MHz radio system, designed to be the backbone of mutual aid communications, ceased functioning, and repairs were delayed for several days. Louisiana State Senator Robert Barham, chairman of the State Senate’s homeland security committee, summed up the situation in Louisiana by stating, “People could not communicate. It got to the point that people were literally writing messages on paper, putting them in bottles, and dropping them from helicopters to other people on the ground.
       Hurricane Katrina necessitated a national response that Federal, State, and local officials were unprepared to provide. The methods that had been employed successfully for the 243 previous major disaster declarations since January 2001 proved inadequate for Hurricane Katrina’s magnitude. The Federal response suffered from significant organization and coordination problems during this week of crisis. The lack of communications and situational awareness had a debilitating effect on the Federal response. Even after coordinating elements were in place, Federal departments and agencies continued to have difficulty adapting their standard procedures to this catastrophic incident. The Federal government’s problems responding to Hurricane Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in our current national preparedness system: the lack of expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and reconstruction. Insufficient planning, training, and interagency coordination are not problems that began and ended with Hurricane Katrina. The storm demonstrated the need for greater integration and synchronization of preparedness efforts, not only throughout the Federal government, but also with the State and local governments and the private and non-profit sectors as well.

Hurricane Katrina Critical Challenges:
1. National Preparedness
2. Integrated Use of Military Capabilities
3. Communications
4. Logistics and Evacuations
5. Search and Rescue
6. Public Safety and Security
7. Public Health and Medical Support
8. Human Services
9. Mass Care and Housing
10. Public Communications
11. Critical Infrastructure and Impact Assessment
12. Environmental Hazards and Debris Removal
13. Foreign Assistance
14. Non-Governmental Aid
15. Training, Exercises, and Lessons Learned
16. Homeland Security Professional Development and Education
17. Citizen and Community Preparedness

       According to Paul C. Light “One of the things that went wrong was the fact FEMA was only to coordinate with state and local. He further stated although FEMA is not a first-responder because that is the task of the state and local police, fire department and other organizations FEMA should have been able to move supplies quickly into play and elevate decisions to the right level of government. The problem was FEMA has the authority to engage the entire federal establishment but they waited too late.” The problems that occurred during this horrific tragedy was;
 · Poor crisis management
· Slow response of federal authorities such as FEMA
· George Bush not setting foot in New Orleans and other worst hit areas for several days to evaluate the situation and the need for assistance
· The fact many countries offered assistance and were rejected. 

 

In conclusion everyone needs to prepare him or herself in doing drills and training just in case they ever had to deal with this problem in the future. Being prepared for a flood, hurricane or tornado is very important and one needs to know where to go and should have enough supplies on hand.  With a catastrophic event such as hurricane Katrina, one major problem was a lack of communication with one another.  The other major problem was the fact Mr. Brown lacked knowledge/ experience in this area.  He had no idea that there were people at the convention center, he had no clue, they should have had aircrafts throwing down food and water for the people, and they should of had better medical care for the people and they should of removed the people that have died in the convention center.  This is a state and a community of people that want to rebuild their lives and should be given the opportunity to do so and for this to be done, they should be given fair monetary allowances to do so.

References:

http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/publications/hurricane_katrina_report_2006_2.pdf
http://ann.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/604/1/10
http://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/discussion/2005/09/27/DI2005092701348.html

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